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1. Introduction
A large number of transport infrastructure projects are funded by government due to 
their inability to directly charge beneficiaries for the benefits provided. Such funding 
has historically been allocated from general taxation revenues but with pressures for 
governments to manage budget deficits and equity concerns, other funding 
mechanisms (over and above user charges) have been sought, and in particular 
mechanisms to better those to link beneficiaries to funding. Value capture is a broad 
term for these, with many different forms in existence, for example developer 
contributions and special levies by local governments, development of government 
owned land and more recently land taxes to capture windfall increases in land value 
generated by infrastructure investment. 
These forms of value capture are collected though specific, active policy action to 
collect additional revenue – representing active value capture mechanisms. They are 
explicitly designed to raise revenue to fund infrastructure. However other 
mechanisms are already capturing value that is derived from infrastructure 
investment in a passive manner – representing passive value capture mechanisms. 
Increases in investment activity (enabled by investment in infrastructure) can lead to 
increases in other taxes such as payroll tax and contract stamp duties (e.g. 
Ernst and Young, 2016), and on the capital value of assets when sold (including that 
on land and businesses). But future income taxation flows to government 
(particularly those from business) represent a stream of cash flow/value that is 
automatically captured, but one that not connected to the land which is used to 
generate that income. Whilst this is acknowledged by elements of the professional 
community and treasury/infrastructure funding bodies (e.g. Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2016), the consideration of income tax in this way has not yet been 
explicitly demonstrated in the literature, and nor is it evident in infrastructure funding 
decisions. This may have a use in such decisions, for which a funding framework 
does not appear to be present. 
In this paper, select case studies of how income tax value capture may occur in 
infrastructure projects are presented through analysis of the applicable estimated 
benefits quantified in their related business cases. Section 2 discusses literature 
pertaining to value capture and explains business cases how they quantify benefits. 
Section 3 discusses the concept of income tax value capture through examination of 
the case study business cases and their projects, and the potential business tax 
value capture they may demonstrate.  Section 4 outlines a potential beneficiary-
based funding approach. In Section 5, limitations, results and conclusions are 
discussed, and an overview of future research directions to further analyse this topic 
are provided.
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2. Value capture and project decision making processes
Investment in transport infrastructure is a perpetual source of attention from a range 
of perspectives. Users want better and faster connections, communities see it as 
valuable to their local economies, and governments want it for economic (and 
political) benefits. A long-standing issue associated with infrastructure is that of how 
to pay for it, and likely in recognition of the broader economic benefits they are 
assumed to bring, government has been a significant funding source over time. 
Users of transport infrastructure in most cases do make some form of payment for 
the use of infrastructure, be it a direct charge such as a road toll or rail track access 
fee however this has historically been insufficient to pay for the total lifetime 
cost of infrastructure provided. As governments have considered these 
infrastructure investments to be economically (though sometimes politically) 
beneficial, they have over time become the funders of transport infrastructure. 
2.1. Value capture mechanisms 
Governments perpetually look to reduce their exposure to infrastructure funding 
requirements, and instead recover some of this investment from beneficiaries of the 
built infrastructure. The concept of value capture is one that may be defined very 
widely1 and covers a range of different programs that collect value from beneficiaries 
to fund infrastructure: 
One recent mechanism is where specific levies are applied to incremental value 
increases caused by infrastructure investment (Batt (2001); Rybeck (2004)). 
Recognising that infrastructure investment leads to (windfall) gains in land values 
through providing faster travel times, improved transport productivity (like heavier 
loadings) or new path options, governments have proposed levies on this land value 
increase as a mechanism to recover some of the value from beneficiaries. There are 
a range of issues however around when, where and how to apply this form of value 
capture (Yen et al 2018; Mulley, Sampaio & Ma 2017; Le, Lim & Leong, 2018; 
Medda 2012; Hui et al, 2004). Once collected, transfer mechanisms (such as loans, 
grants or even tax increment financing (e.g. Zhao et. al. 2010) for example), are then 
used to transfer funds collected to infrastructure constructors. 
“Value capture is an umbrella term, covering a range of revenue 
mechanisms with a common goal . . . funding projects from 
beneficiaries rather than from taxpayers. Value capture . . . describes 
the spectrum of mechanisms. . . This includes user pay mechanisms, 
developer charges and contributions, targeted and broad betterment 
levies, property development rights, asset sales or leases, major 
beneficiary contributions, and other non-land taxes or levies”. (Ernst and 
Young, (2016) in Abelson (2018)) 
1 Although see below where it has become more recently a narrower term for a specific form of value transfer of 
land tax amounts. 
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One recent mechanism is where specific levies are applied to incremental value 
increases caused by infrastructure investment (Batt (2001); Rybeck (2004)). 
Recognising that infrastructure investment leads to (windfall) gains in land values 
through providing faster travel times, improved transport productivity (like heavier 
loadings) or new path options, governments have proposed levies on this land value 
increase as a mechanism to recover some of the value from beneficiaries. There are 
a range of issues however around when, where and how to apply this form of value 
capture (Yen et al 2018; Mulley, Sampaio & Ma 2017; Le, Lim & Leong, 2018; Medda 
2012; Hui et al, 2004). Once collected, transfer mechanisms (such as loans, grants or 
even tax increment financing (e.g. Zhao et. al. 2010) for example), are then used to 
transfer funds collected to infrastructure constructors. 
These types of value capture might best be classified as active value capture 
mechanisms, mechanisms which have been explicitly designed to transfer value from 
land and other beneficiaries to the providers of infrastructure, where the infrastructure 
created leads to increases in land and capital values in proximity to that infrastructure 
However, both the academic and professional literatures have not yet considered 
extant value capture mechanisms as found in current taxation processes - passive 
value capture mechanisms. These mechanisms are quite separate from land. These 
are usually non-transactional, recurrent in nature and will deliver returns over and 
beyond the term of the infrastructure project. They include payroll taxes, contract 
stamp duties, and importantly for this paper, income tax. When an infrastructure 
project proceeds, each of these mechanisms begins to collect revenues generated 
(indirectly) by this investment.  But importantly, sans this investment, it would not be 
generated and collected. Whilst known to somewhat of a limited degree in professional 
practice (e.g. Ernst and Young, 2016), this form of value capture is not apparrent in 
infrastructure funding decision making processes.  
Later in this paper we will elaborate on this and demonstrate how value capture 
through these extant taxes may already be working to collect revenues. However 
before doing that we will discuss how project benefits are quantified and assessed, in 
order to better understand the nature of project benefits from which value can be 
captured and lay the groundwork to explain how these benefits could link to 
infrastructure funding decisions. 
2.2. Infrastructure investment decision making 
Infrastructure decisions in Australia has increasingly come under greater scrutiny 
when funding is provided by government. Investment some decades ago may have 
been approved based on departmental intuition, some opaque and non-transparent 
internal assessments or political aims. But needs for more propriety in investment 
decision making have seen processes implemented to assess and document these 
decisions in business cases (for example, Infrastructure Australia, 2018).  
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A business case is a collection of sub-elements which can stand together to create a 
detailed document that how an investment decision is made. By describing the project, 
the project options, decision making frameworks, information inputs, project risks and 
how they are managed, and (importantly for this paper) the net financial and economic 
benefits associated with the project, governments are increasingly showing why 
certain projects are selected and why others are not. If a project has positive net 
economic benefits, it generally proceeds. 
Given its importance, the economic appraisal is one element of the business case that 
is defined, especially considering it is a stand-alone tool and has been used for some 
time before and separate to the business case.  Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the 
key method used to complete this analysis, comparing discounted  costs and benefits 
to determine the net economic position. Project benefits can be wide and varied, 
however typical transport benefits include travel time savings and vehicle operating 
cost savings (De Jong, 2000). In projects where mode shifts are envisaged, benefits 
may include environmental and safety (Forkenbrock, 1999; Janic, 2007), road 
consumption/damage, health (Cavill et al, 2008) and congestion (Dachis, 2013). Each 
project is different but typically for transport projects, user savings are a large 
proportion of the project benefit, with environmental, safety, congestion and 
infrastructure benefits providing lesser benefits. Accurate benefits identification is a 
developing and evolving process, such as recent conceptualisation of wider economic 
benefits (Lakshmanan, 2011) into the decision process.  
Interestingly, some business cases are beginning to consider passive value collection 
mechanisms as increased payroll taxes and stamp duties (see for example Sydney 
Metro (2016), p.88) but this paper posits that all passive value capture sources, 
including income tax play a role in project funding decisions. We now turn to a practical 
analysis of two projects to demonstrate how this may be the case  and discuss how 
this may impact infrastructure funding decisions by government. 
3. Value capture through income taxation
As discussed, value capture is more than just about land and capital amounts.  There 
are extant value capture mechanisms operating on non-transactional, non-capital 
flows of a business. We now seek to demonstrate how this concept may assist funding 
decisions through a case study examination (Eisenhardt, 1989) of recent transport 
infrastructure project business cases. By analysing benefits generated by the cases, 
we show additional income tax is generated through project investment that would not 
have otherwise been. 
The Infrastructure Priority List as prepared by Infrastructure Australia (2019) was 
obtained.  This list was reviewed to identify those projects that had been assessed by 
Infrastructure Australia and that focussed primarily on business user benefits. 
Substantially all road projects were eliminated given they contained significant 
passenger benefits which, as will be discussed later, may lead to different taxation 
outcomes than freight benefits. From this list, two freight rail infrastructure projects 
were identified being the Murray Basin Rail Project (MB), in the north west of Victoria, 
and the Inland Rail Project (IR) from Melbourne to Brisbane. These are representative 
of business focussed projects under construction in Australia and business cases are 
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prepared on a pre-tax basis (see Australian Rail Track Corporation, 2015).  Their 
business cases report a CBA of more than 12. 
The benefits identified in these projects are shown in 
Table 1. These are categorised into categories depending on the beneficiaries of those 
benefits. Figure 1 shows these benefits by beneficiaries as a proportion of total 
benefits. 
Table 1: Total project benefits by type 
Project Inland Rail(a) Murray Basin(b) 
Benefit A$(m) % A$(m) % 
Freight user benefits 
- Value of freight time
- Reduced transport costs
11,616 52 598 79 
Passenger user benefits 32 0 - - 
Public benefits 
- Greenhouse gas reductions
- Congestion reduction
- Amenity improvement
1,560 9 86 11 
Government agency benefits 
- Avoided crash costs
- Avoided road damage
890 5 73 10 
Infrastructure owner benefits 
- Residual value
- Reduced lifecycle costs
8,405 16 2 0 
Total 22,502 100 760 100 
Australian Rail Track Corporation (2015), Department of Economic Development, Jobs Transport and 
Resources (2015). 
Amounts rounded to nearest whole number, figures may not sum due to rounding. 
(a) - At 4% discount rate, including Western Line Upgrade, P50 cost estimates.
(b) - At 7% discount rate.
2 For the purposes of this paper CBA quality is not questioned, however for balance media discussion on this is 
noted. 
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Figure 1 – Proportion of benefit by beneficiary 
The above analysis shows freight user benefits form the majority of the benefits in both 
projects. These business benefits are in the form of reduced transport costs and 
therefore are implicitly assumed to increase business profitability, in a monetary 
sense. Most of these benefits are monetary savings through lower operating costs, 
(91% of freight user benefits for MB and 55% for IR), or improvements to reliability and 
availability (16% for IR). The remainder of these benefits relate to the value of freight 
time savings, which may or may not accrue to users (Sambacos and Remfo, 2016). 
But for the purpose of this analysis it is assumed that all benefits will translate, on the 
user population/supply chain as a whole, to taxable income increases. 
As noted, this is different to passengers who may be less likely to use their time to 
generate more income (and instead use it for perhaps leisure). Because of lower 
freight costs, it is assumed that taxable income will increase for these businesses by 
the amount of cost lowered. In the accounting literature, the concept of tax effect 
accounting (Graham et. al., 2012) acts to recognise tax impacts on business 
transactions in balance sheets of businesses, recognising future tax receivables and 
payables. Modifying this concept to infrastructure project funding suggests that the 
benefits of the project that accrue to users, assuming these benefits translate into 
taxable income, will lead to higher taxation revenues for government in future tax 
years.  This represents the value capture through income taxation, and the 
hypothecated and simplified net present value of funding captured in these projects is 
indicated in Table 2. 
Table 2: Income tax value capture 
Project Inland Rail Murray 
Basin 
Freight user benefits 11,616 598 
Income taxation value capture (at 30%) 3,485 180 
This means potentially 30% of the freight user benefits may be considered to return to 
government through taxation, which may have relevance for funding decisions. This 
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analysis is based on some key assumptions (which will be considered in more detail 
in the discussion). The first key assumption is that the benefits estimated in simulation 
are realised in practice. It is unclear for how much of the identified benefit will be 
realised especially given uncertainty. Secondly (as above), all benefits are assumed 
to translate into increased taxable income for freight users. Thirdly, there may be some 
form of multiplier effect that dynamically changes the net present value of the 
underlying benefits through for example other investments being made by freight 
users that lead to taxable income being generated by other downstream beneficiaries. 
For now, assume freight user benefits act as a proxy for all up and downstream users 
and assume that the multiplier effect is zero. Fourthly, the corporate tax rate is 
assumed to be 30%. In reality, different businesses all have individual tax rates based 
on timing differences in their income tax returns, and they may have rates higher or 
lower than 30%. Governments may change this rate, and different countries have 
different rates which may change this analysis in other jurisdictions. 
The now identified source of value capture through income tax may assist in decision 
making processes for funding. They may reflect amounts that government could 
contribute and maintain a positive investment position in the project. But at the present 
stage, there are no set mechanisms that link benefits discussed above to funding 
arrangements. Applying a beneficiary-based perspective, a framework may be 
designed where beneficiaries, including users and government, may pay for this. 
4. A benefits-based funding framework
Despite the push towards a user pays framework across a range of policy and program 
areas throughout all levels of Australian government, there is no set framework for 
when it comes to funding infrastructure, with large proportions of it still coming from 
public funds (or through private sector funding with guarantees provided by 
government), albeit sometimes under grants with program rules. 
Before doing so, the benefits and to whom they accrue needs explanation, to inform 
who, under a user pays system, the ultimate funders may be. These benefits are 
grouped as described in  
Table 1 and Figure 1 as User, Government, Public and Infrastructure Owner. User 
benefits accrue to the users of services that are expected to use the service, being 
through lower freight charges which in this case are mainly financial in nature. As 
assumed above, it is assumed that these benefits accrue to the freight users. Public 
benefits accrue to the general community as they are difficult to assign to individuals. 
Government benefits are assumed to accrue to government departments/agencies 
which will no longer have to incur costs. For example, road damage benefits would 
accrue to federal, state and local government road owners who would not have to 
maintain or roads. Avoided crash cost includes emergency services and road 
management agency time and materials that are incurred in the response, 
management and rehabilitation activities required to deal with crashes. Infrastructure 
benefits accrue to infrastructure owners as a result of project investment and the future 
cash flow benefits that are obtained past the end of the assessment period (which is 
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usually 30 years but can be longer)3. These infrastructure owners are in this case, and 
many cases, government owned as well. 
Based on these classifications, a beneficiary funding framework can be developed. In 
the case of Public benefits (in the absence of any other specific beneficiaries being 
identified), it may be argued that governments should fund these given their broad 
base of recipients of these benefits. Whilst there is no legal/regulatory mechanism that 
requires this, government funding would be logical where the project would lead to 
savings in other government agencies, or where it would help achieve other policy 
aims, including say international environmental treaties and urban liveability. In the 
case of Infrastructure Owner benefits, particularly when this owner is a government 
agency, that Infrastructure Owner would be the likely funder of these benefits. Finally, 
Government departments/agencies, may be willing to contribute to projects where that 
contribution would reduce the cost of running those agencies. We would assume that 
for each of these beneficiary classes that an amount that would be funded would be 
equal to the amount of benefit that they receive. 
Turning to User benefits, a strict application of user pays principles would dictate that 
users should pay for these. However, in certain cases, the amount of user charge 
required to be levied to raise these funds may lead to freight rates that are not be 
competitive with other options (particularly due to the present market failure in road 
user charging). This would mean the project would not proceed, despite the net 
positive economic benefits. But an argument may be made that taking into account 
the value capture amount above, Government funding of the amount that their 
captured value represents of those User benefits may be made, without leaving 
Government worse off, but still allowing the project benefits to be obtained.  
We now use the MB and IR projects to examine how this funding framework may apply 
in practice. Table 3 shows the beneficiaries and their classifications for the Murray 
Basin Project. 
Table 3: Beneficiary analysis - Murray Basin Rail Project 
Project Murray Basin Rail 
Government Public Users 
Benefit A$(m) Agency and 
Infrastructure 
Owner 
Income 
taxation 
value 
capture 
Freight user benefits 598 - 180 - 418 
Public benefits 86 - - 86 - 
Government agency benefits 73 73 - - - 
Infrastructure owner benefits 2 2 - - - 
Total 760 75 180 86 418 
3 Note also that in business cases the infrastructure owner benefits are sometimes a function of the discounted 
cashflow methodology which assumes all remaining benefits at the end of the assessment period accrue to the 
infrastructure owner. In reality this benefit is a proxy for future benefits of a similar nature to the other benefits, 
e.g. the future benefits to users, public and government agencies.
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Table 4 follows on and shows the beneficiary funding framework and the net 
investment position of the Victorian and Federal Governments for MB. Due to the split 
of funding between the Federal and State Governments, it is assumed that the Agency 
and Infrastructure Owner benefits accrue to the Victorian governments (as the key 
agencies involved are mainly state based) and the Public benefits are covered half 
each by both governments.  
Table 4: Funding analysis - Murray Basin Rail Project 
Project Murray Basin Rail 
 A$m Victorian 
Government 
Federal 
Government 
Users 
Government – Agency and Infrastructure 
Owner 
75 - - 
Government – Income tax value capture - 180 - 
General public 43 43 - 
Users - - 418 
Total 118 223 418 
Funding provided 220 220 
Surplus/(deficit) (102) 3 
As shown, the Victorian government may be incurring a substantial deficit in delivering 
the project, with the Federal Government making a small, likely immaterial gain on the 
project. Users make a substantial gain (their contribution in the form of user fees is not 
available for the analysis). Whether by design or not, the Federal Government is 
behaviour is consistent with this framework, however the Victorian Government’s is 
not (it is likely that the 50% each split of the total funding amount is a more pertinent 
driver).4 The Victorian Government, as the owner of the rail infrastructure, might 
charge more for this, but for distortions in the land transport market through the lack 
of user and congestion fees for road transport. (However, questions might be asked 
about whether the MB business case contains all benefits, noting that this project 
would likely preserve container traffic from Mildura to the Port of Melbourne. This 
traffic, without the cost-effective rail access envisaged in the project may be redirected 
to the Port of Adelaide given the almost 200-kilometre difference in road transport 
distance and cost. Given this business case was written before the finalisation of the 
Port of Melbourne sale, preserving this traffic might have had financial benefit to the 
Victorian Government that was not included in the benefits of the MB project). 
Analysis of the IR project spans 3 states but is Federally funded government, general 
public and users. The Inland Rail benefits are therefore analysed in Table 5.  
4 In somewhat of a post script, due to poor management of project costs, the Murray Basin Project has been 
augmented by another project, the Freight Passenger Rail Separation project with a cost of approximately $130 
million, bringing total Victorian government investment to approximately $350m, increasing their deficit.  
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Government General 
public 
Users 
Benefit A$(m) Agency and 
Infrastructure 
Owner 
Income 
taxation 
value 
capture 
Freight user benefits 11,616 - 3,485 - 8,130 
Passenger user benefits 32 - - - 32 
Public benefits 1,560 - - 1,560 - 
Government agency benefits 890 890 - - - 
Infrastructure owner benefits 8,405 8,405 - - - 
Total 22,502 9,295 3,485 1,560 8,162 
Using these benefits and beneficiaries, Table 6 shows a possible funding framework 
and the net investment position of the Federal Government for the IR project. 
Table 6: Funding analysis - Inland Rail Project at proponent discount rate (4%) 
Project Inland Rail 
 A$m Federal 
Government 
Users 
Government – Agency and Infrastructure Owner 9,295 - 
Government – Income tax value capture 3,485 - 
General public 1,560 - 
Users - 8,162 
Total 14,340 8,162 
Funding provided* 8,575 
Surplus/(deficit) 5,765 
*Adjusted P50 investment value per business case. Using the unadjusted P90 value would result
in a surplus of $3,640 million. 
Under a beneficiary funding framework, the Federal Government’s investment is 
already justified on the benefits that its project will generate for its own agencies 
(including the Infrastructure Owner). However, its position is improved when general 
public benefits and income tax value capture are added – where from a government 
perspective, the IR investment has a significant project return. 
5. Limitations, discussion, conclusions and future
research directions
The analysis above shows how there is a presently undefined form of passive value 
capture that exists through the collection of incremental income taxes that arise as a 
result of infrastructure investment by government (a funding collection mechanism). 
This income tax receipt, when considered in conjunction with other benefits, may 
support government investment in projects where there are net economic benefits, but 
not net financial ones, so long as the amounts spent by government are less than the 
Project Inland Rail 
Table 5: Beneficiary analysis - Inland Rail Project 
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amounts that they recover from the project (a funds distribution mechanism). However, 
there are a number of issues surrounding this premise that require discussion. 
 
Firstly, this is a hypothetical case and political realities mean that such a framework 
may be difficult to implement.  In our complicated system of government, with federal, 
state, local, political, departmental and industrial actors, applying more rules to 
investment decision making that may limit potential project investment may be difficult 
to achieve.  In addition there are a myriad of current schemes, programs and grant 
systems in place that would need to be re-examined and/or replaced. 
 
Perhaps most significantly, the application of this concept may need consideration 
from the perspective of various taxation principles, as the use of income tax funding 
in this way may considered as to be a hypothecation of those revenues. Use of income 
tax in this way does have some similarities to tax increment financing (Zhao et. al. 
2010), where all property taxes for a defined development area are quarantined and 
redirected to the developer (usually via a government agency). And so it may also be 
accompanied by some of the same problems, including the creation of equity issues 
where funding that would otherwise be available to governments to use on other 
projects is granted to specific groups of tax payers, through the provision of 
infrastructure. It may also be characterised as a tax rebate or subsidy for these 
taxpayers.  
 
It is noted above that government participation in projects in this way, which due to the 
various interactions of funding across government may result in a net zero or positive 
cashflow for government, may lead to economic projects being advanced where they 
would otherwise not proceed based on financial assessment alone. This would unlock 
economic benefits in a range of areas that otherwise would not be. However, the 
alternative uses for this funding, at varying levels of risk and return in different projects 
across different parts of government, should be considered alongside the use of 
income tax revenues in this manner. Additionally, this concept may lead to suggestions 
that income tax revenues be hypothecated to subsidise a range of financially viable 
infrastructure projects, despite the benefits users would obtain through investment. 
Should policy decisions be made as a result of this analysis, further consideration from 
the perspective of a number of taxation principles would be required. 
 
A second major area of concern is the dependence on the above analysis on business 
case results. Business cases are models of reality, and the actual results achieved will 
differ from the modelled results. As noted the Murray Basin project has seen a cost 
overrun and given current drought conditions, the benefits associated with the project 
may not be certain either. Business cases can be very dependent on the inputs into 
them, including how users would use infrastructure and so the benefits they would 
derive, the discount rates (e.g. see Terrill and Batrouney, 2018) and other factors. 
Whilst business cases are subject to guidelines for preparation, a number of issues 
remain outstanding with regards to these inputs which may impact on the overall 
position of the benefits that are quantified in them and the cost benefit analyses that 
are performed with these benefits. For example, the IR project, carried out at a 7% 
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discount rate, reveals a different result as shown in Table 7, with At 7%, the 
government instead incurring a deficit of almost $5 billion dollars5.  
Table 7: Funding analysis - Inland Rail Project at Infrastructure Australia discount rate (7%) 
Project Inland Rail 
 A$m Federal 
Government 
Users 
Government – Agency and Infrastructure Owner 1,495 - 
Government – Income tax value capture 1,494 - 
General public 664 - 
Users -  3,499 
Total 3,653 3,499 
Funding provided* 8,575   
Surplus/(deficit) (4,922)   
 
Further research is required to analyse the benefits modelled in business cases and 
determine how accurate this modelling is. From assessing the effectiveness of data 
collection methods and analysis, to determining values for freight travel time and cost 
savings from different modes, a more accurate and reliable accounting method for 
these amounts will improve business case credibility. Importantly, quantification of 
how much of these benefits do actually turn into additional financial income and 
therefore taxation revenues (which are of significance to urban infrastructure decision 
making) is an essential step in determining how much value has been captured 
through this mechanism. In addition, as alluded to in the assumptions to this analysis, 
there may be multiplier effects of this infrastructure investment that need to be 
quantified and understood which may change the amounts of benefits quantified 
through the business case process. Business cases themselves may also warrant 
further augmentation with the funding decisions to support investment, which would 
help explain funding decisions by governments. 
 
Further research into this issue will aid treasury, infrastructure and transport policy 
makers in better understanding their longer-term financial positions and the impacts 
of future income tax revenue on investment decisions in infrastructure, particularly 
infrastructure which is economic but not financial.  
 
5 The issue of appropriate discount rate requires further research, given long life assets such as rail infrastructure 
and benefits well past the 30-year assessment period.  
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